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SURFACE DRAINAGE.

This subject being a branch of the law of real property,
it is quite probable that questions as to the rights and remedies of parties interested therein, and arising out of the
subject of surface drainage, are as old as the law of real
property itself.

But in the earlier or more primitive stages

in the development of the law of realty it can hardly be supposed that so much importance was accorded the subject as in
more modern times.

Without undertaking a minute or detailed

examination of the processes by which it has been evolved until reaching its present status, it is perhaps sufficient to
say that an examination of the authorities in the American
courts will convince one that the subject is one of much importance, often litigated, and that the cases are in such a
state of confusion that it would be an utter impossibility to
reduce them to a state of harmony.

Real property throughout

this country is being rapidly and steadily developed in value
and, of course, it will follow from this that those who are
the owners thereof, or who have property rights therein, will
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be more diligent in ascertaining and enforcing rights originating or issuing therefrom.
Perhaps it will be well, before proceeding to a discussion of the law of the subject, to make an effort to gain at
least a rough idea of what is meant by the term 'surface water', for laws on the subject of surface drainage would be
needless unless there be something to which the laws are to
be applied.

In Hoyt v. Hudson (27 Wis. 656), a water course

is said to be "a stream

sually. flowing in a particular di-

rection, though it need not flow continually.
times be dry.

It may some-

It must flow in a definite channel, having a

bed, sides or banks, and usually discharge itself into some
other stream or body of water.

It must be something more

than mere surface drainage over the entire surface of a tract
of land, occasioned by unusual freshets or other extraordinary
causes.

It does not include the water flowing in hollows or

ravines in land, which is the mere surface water from rain or
melting snow, and is discharged through them from a higher to
a lower level, but which at other times are destitute of water.

Such hollows or ravines are not, in legal contemplation,

water courses.'

While courts cannot frame, logically, accu-

rate definitions of the terms above referred to, yet one may

form a fair general idea of what 'surface water' is, by excluding all subterranean waters, and that before referred to
under the description of water courses.
One great cause of the confusion, before referred to, of
the authorities in this country on the subject of surface
drainage, is the fact that the doctrines both of the civil law
and the common law are each relied on as the guide for the
courts in expounding the rights of parties litigant ; and, as
the doctrines of each system of jurisprudence are, on this
point, wholly at variance, confusion cannot help but follow.
Then, in other courts, it seems to have been the policy to
blend or combine the principles of the common and the civil
law in deciding cases of this sort.

This, of course, brings

another element of confusion into the cases.

As to whether

the policy of either system of jurisprudence will eventually
prevail throughout the country on this subject, it is difficult to determine or foresee.
There is one branch of the law, which in many respects is
analogous to the law of surface water, that is now pretty firmly established on a basis that seems to us would be a fair way
of ruling in cases which involve questions of surface water
and surface drainage.

That is this : by the doctrine of

ancient lights, the owner of the serviejn

tenement was bound

to so use and improve his lands, tenements,
the lights, views,
and unimpaired.

etc.,

as to leave

etc. of the dominant tenement unobstructed
The above doctrine has been generally repu-

diated in this country, the States of New York and New Jersey
being perhaps the only States where the doctrine is recognized.
In Stein v. Hauck, an Indiana case decided in 1878, the court,
among other things, said, on the subject of ancient lights
"The owmer of space may and can not know of right the internal arrangements of his neighbor's house, and may stand by
while the claim which is to finally invade, if not to embarrass and destroy the usefulness of his land, is gradually accruing against him until it becomes a vested right which he
cannot dispute.

The boundaries of land are generally suf-

ficient for the supply of its owm light and air ; and we do
not see why the owner should be allowed to go beyond them in
order to supply himself with these blessings, against the
rights of another, or to turn that which was granted him as a
favor into an injury to the grantor.

We cannot see why this

rule will work injury to any one, and we think it will place
these claims on a safe footing.

It is very easy to reserve

such an easement to the vendor or to grant it to the vendee
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in the deed which conveys the land, or to create it by valid
contract.

Then each one knows what he sells and what he

buys, and all persons are protected in their rights.'
Now mere surface water, while it can be collected into
a body, as ponds, cisterns and the like, yet if

left to itself

is of a very shifting and changeable nature, and will stay in
a given place only so long as confined artificially, or until
it reaches its level by the force of gravitation.

And it is

no more natural for light to shine through a window or water
to run down hill than it

is for a man to have the right to so

use his own land as may please or profit him, provided he does
not injure another person unnecessarily,- that is, directly
and intentionally, and not remotely and consequentially,- and
the terms dominant and servient tenement are of no importance
in the determination of the rights of parties interested in
surface drains, unless they are considered on the basis of regular easements.

On the whole, it seems to us that the views

of the common law in the treatment of the subject are preferable to those of the Roman law.
Evansv$ile (25 Wis. 223),

In the case of Pettiire

v.

Justice Dixon, delivering the opin-

ion of the court, among other things, said :

'Every owner may

lawfully so improve his own land as to prevent the flow of
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surface water thereon from the land of his neighbor.

And, so

too, if the running of surface water from one man's land, when
in a state of nature or othervise, off on to or over the land
of another,

is such as to be beneficial to the latter, still

he cannot claim it as a legal right or prescribe for it after
any length of time.

The first proprietor may so provide, by

suitable erections or appliances on his own land, as to retain the water or cause it to flow in another direction.

It

is the duty of every owner of land, if he wishes to carry off
the surface water from his own lands, to do so without material injury or detriment to the lands of his neighbors ; and if
he cannot do so, he must suffer the inconvenience arising from
its presence, and he cannot complain that others refuse to
allow its passage over their lands.

Such is the sound and

wholesome doctrine of the law on this subject ; and although
it does not go so far as to require the owner to resort to
artificial means to prevent the surface water from his land
flowing on to the land of another, when such flowing is produced by natural causes, yet it will prevent him from using
such means for the purpose of making it flow there whenever
the same would be materially injurious to the proprietor thereof.

And it is also true, as stated in the books, that con-
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siderable latitude is left to the owners of estates as to the
manner in which they will improve and cultivate them ; and
in so doing they may undoubtedly somewhat change the course
and flow of the surface water, so as in a measure to increase
the quantity which would otherwise pass upon the lands of
others.

They may also fill up low or wet places, so as to

render them arable or fit for crops, thus causing the water
which previously settled in them to spread and pass upon the
lands of others, doing no perceptible injury thereto.

But

the extent to which any proprietor may go, in these and other
ways, in turning the surface water of his own land off on to
the lands of others must, in each case, we think, be determined by the degree of injury which it will produce.
slight damage will not, perhaps, be regarded ;

Very

but, if the

injury be immediate, and such as to perceptibly and naturally
impair the value or destroy the usefulness of the adjoining
estate, we apprehend that the law will not permit it to be
done ; and certainly we know of no adjudged case where it has
been held that the waters of a natural pond or reservoir upon
the land of one person may be drained by him directly upon the
land of another greatly to his injury ; nor where one owner
has been allowed, by means of a ditch, trench, sewer or the
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like, to gather the surface water from his own land and throw
it upon the land of another so as materially to lessen its
value and produce injury to the owner.

Such a proceeding

would be contrary to natural right and justice, and the law
does not sanction it.

If the owner of land has the right,

by artificial means, to prevent the flowing thereon of surface water from the land of another, which in a natural state
would flow there, it follows & fortior

that no owner may with

impunity turn the surface water from his land upon the land of
another, to the injury of the latter, when, without the employment of artificial means for that purpose, the same never
would have flowed there at all.

The two rights would be en-

tirely inconsistent with each other --- the right in one owner
to undo or totally defeat what the other had rightfully done."
To the same point is Washburne on Easements (226, 353,
355), where he says :

"The owner of an upper field cannot

construct drains or excavations so as to form new channels
on to the lower field of another, nor can he collect the waters of several channels and discharge them on the lower field
so as to increase the wash upon the same.'
The doctrine of the Massachusetts courts on this subject
is stated by Mr. Angell on Water Courses (Sec. 108 &), where

he says : "The right of an owner of land to occupy and improve it in such manner and for such purposes as he may see
fit, either by changing the surface, or the erection of buildings or other structures thereon, is not restricted or modified by the fact that his own land is so situated with reference to that of adjoining owners that an alteration in the
mode of its improvement or occupation in any portion of it
will cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains and
snows falling on its surface, or flowing on to it over the
surface of adjacent lots, either to stand in unusual quantities on other adjacent lands, or pass on to or over the same
in greater quantities or in other directions than they were
accustomed to flow.

Where there is no water course by grant

or prescription, and no stipulation exists between conterminous proprietors of land concerning the mode in which their
respective parcels shall be occupied and improved, no right
to regulate the surface drainage of water can be asserted by
the owner of one lot over that of his neighbor.
solum, ejus es

Ujs2L

usque &I cou, is a general rule applicable

to the use and enjoyments of real property, and the right of a
party to the free and unfettered control of his own land above,
upon and beneath the surface cannot be interfered with or re-
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strained by any considerations of injury to others which may
be occasioned by the flow of mere surface water in consequence
of the lawful appropriation of land by its owner to a particular mode of use or enjoyment.

Nor is it at all material, in

the application of this principle of law, whether a party obstructs or changes the flow of surface water by preventing it
from coming within the limits of his own land, or by erecting
barriers or changing the level of the soil so as to turn it
off in a new course after it has come within his boundaries,
and cause it to flow in a new direction on the land of a conterminous proprietor where it had not previously been accustomed to flow.

The obstruction of surface water, or an al-

teration in the flow of it, affords no cause of action in behalf of any person who may suffer loss or detriment therefrom
against one who does not act inconsistent with the due exercise of dominion over his own soil.

A party may improve any

portion of his land, although he may thereby cause the surface water flowing thereon, whencesoever it may come, to pass
off in a different direction and in larger quantities than
previously.

If such an act causes damage to adjacent land,

it is daum

a

injuria.

It makes no difference in the

application of this rule that the land is naturally wet and
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swampy.

A conterminous proprietor may change the situation

or surface of his land by raising or filling it to a higher
grade, by the construction of dykes, the erection of structures or by improvements which cause water to accumulate from
natural causes on adjacent, land and prevent it from passing
off over the surface.

Such consequences are the natural re-

sult of the lawful appropriation of land, whatever may be it
its nature, and although they may cause detriment and loss to
others."
The doctrine of the New York, New Hampshire and Rhode
Island courts is to the same effect, and in stating the New
York view it was said, in respect to the running off of surface water caused by rain or snow, that "no principle on which
the decisions of their courts were based would prevent the
owner of land from filling up the wet and marshy places on his
own soil, for its amelioration and his own advantage, because

his neighbor's land is so situated as to be incommoded by it.
Such a doctrine would militate against the well settled rule
that the owner of land has full dominion over the whole space
above and below the surface.'

(Angell on Water Courses, Sec.

108 b.)
In Rhode Island it was said, 'whether water has fallen

as rain or has come from the overflow of a pond or swamp,
which sinks into the top soil and struggles through it, following no definite channel, it is deemed by the law absolutely to belong to the owner of the land upon which it is found,
for the avowed purpose of enabling him to cultivate his land
by controlling or draining it off in the mode most convenient
to him ;

and is not affected by any right in the owner of an

adjoining~river, pond or tank which it may chance for the time
to feed, though that time be ever so long protracted.

It is

not water in a water course, or in an infinitesimal number of
minute water courses, in the sense of being obedient to the
law regulating the use of water flowing in such defined natural channels ; but is, in th-e eye of the law, as well as of
common sense, the moisture, and a part of the soil with which
it intermingles, to be there used by the owner of the soil, if
to his advantage, or to be got rid of in any mode he pleases,
if to his detriment."

The facts which illustrate the princi-

ple under consideration in the Rhode Island case were these :
There had been a grant of a certain spring or fountain of water, with the privilege of deepening it, and of making other
improvements on the land and about the fountain, for the purpose of obtaining the full use and benefit of the water there-

of ;

but, inasmuch as the fountain appeared to be fed by a

spring which issued from beneath a rock at the bottom of the
fountain, and the grant contemplated that the land on which
the fountain was situated was to be used for agricultural purposes, it was held that the owner of the land was not thereby
deprived of the right of properly draining his land to make
it

productive,

even though the drainage of the land might draw

off some of the surface water, which possibly would otherwise
have found its way through the soil into the fountain.

(An-

gell on Water Courses, Sec. 108 b-.)
Without going further, enough has, perhaps, been said to
briefly indicate the ideas of the courts that hold to the common law doctrine in relation to the subject under consideration.

Brief attention will now be given to the civil law

doctrine, as stated by the courts in some of the States of
this country, which is to the effect that because water is
descendible by nature from an upper to a lower surface, the
olmer of the upper land has an easement in the land of the
proprietor below for the discharge of all waters which by nature rise in or flow or fall upon the land of such upper owner.

And, further, where two fields adjoin, and one is lower

than the other, the lower must necessarily be subject to all
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the natural flow of water from the upper one.

The inconven-

ience arises from its position, and is usually more than compensated by other circumstances*

Hence, the owner of the

lower ground has no right to erect embankments whereby the
natural flow of water from the upper ground shall be stopped ;
nor has the owner of the upper ground a right to make any excavations or drains by which the flow of water is directed
from its natural channel, and a new channel made on the lower
ground ; nor can he collect into one channel waters usually
flowing off into his neighbor's fields by several channels,
and thus increase the wash upon the lower fields.

But he

may, and good husbandry sometimes requires that he should,
cover up and conceal the drains through his own land, keeping
the place of discharge unchanged.

And as he may use running

streans to irrigate his lands, even though he does thereby not
unreasonably diminish the supply of his neighbor, so also he
may use proper means of draining his ground where it is too
moist, and discharge the water through the natural channel,
even though the flow of the water upon the land of his neighbor be thereby somewhat increased.

If it be difficult to as-

certain from the character of the surface what is the natural
channel, then the course in which the water has long been

peaceably and openly permitted to run will be considered as
having had a legitimate origin.

(Amgell on Water Courses,

Sec. 108 d.)
The rule of the civil law prevails in Pennsylvania,
Illinois, Ohio, and perhaps in other States.

Iowa,

In the case of

Butler v. Pec __(16 Ohio St. 334), it was said : "The principle
seems to be established and indisputable, that where two parcels of land, belonging to different owners, lie adjacent, to
each other, and one parcel lies lower than the other, the lower one owes a servitude to the upper to receive the water
which naturally runs from it, provided the industry of man has
not been used to create the servitude.

Or, in other words

more familiar to students of the common law, the owner of the
upper parcel of land has a natural easement in the lower parcel, to the extent of the natural flow of water from the upper
parcel to the lower."
Perhaps enough has now been said to indicate with sufficient fullness the views of courts which hold the rule of
the civil or Roman law on this subject.

It will next be

proper to ask, whether one may by prescription gain the right
to have the water flow upon or off of his land ?

The term

"prescription' is in strictness applied to incorporeal heredi-
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taments and not to land, and is based on the presumption of a
former grant which has been lost, and that nothing can be
claimed by prescription that cannot, be granted ;

and, by

older writers, the enjoyment of the hereditament must have
been time out of mind, but of later times it is generally required that the use be only for a fixed time,-- usually twenty years.

It would seem that cases of this kind could not

often arise, as surface water would not be likely to remain
in one place long enough to give such a question a chance to
arise.

'The flow of water for twenty years from the eaves

of a house does not give a right to the neighbor to insist
that the house shall not be pulled down or altered, so as to
diminish the quantity of water flowing from the roof.

The

flow of water for twenty years from a drain made for agricultural improvements does not give a right to the neighbor, so
as to preclude the proprietor from altering the level of his
drain, for the greater improvement of his land.

The state

of circumstances in such cases shows that the one party never
intended to give, nor the other to enjoy, the use of the water
as a matter of right."
in Pettigre

And

(Addison on Torts, Sec. 330.)

v. Evansville (25 Wis. 223), it was said that

None proprietor of land has no legal right, and can acquire no

prescriptive right, to have the surface water, accumulating
on his own land by rain or melting snow, flow off on to or
over the land of an adjoining proprietor, as it has been accustomed and would in the future continue to do were the land
of such adjoining proprietor suffered to remain as in a state
of nature ; nor can such adjoining proprietor, in case the
flowing of the water off on to or over his land should be beneficial to him, claim the legal right, or acquire the privilege by prescription, of having the same continue, against the
will of the owner upon whose lands the water actually falls
and accumulates.

And the same rule holds good when applied

to sub-surface water passing through the earth by percolation."
In Missouri, by Sec. 6561, R. SO.of 1889, it is declared
that "the common law of England, and all statutes and acts of
Parliament made prior to the fourth year of the reign of James
the First, and which are of a general nature and not local to
that kingdom, which common law and statutes are not repugnant
to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States,
the Constitution of this State, or the statute laws in force
for the time being, shall be the rule of action and decision
in this State, any law, custom or usuage to the contrary notwithstanding.'

There has been considerable litigation in

Missouri over the subject under consideration, but with two
exceptions the common law doctrine has been followed by the
Supreme Court.
Co.

In McCormick v. L.

_..,

2'L. ,L. J&
.C-..

Ii. . R.

(57 Mo. 433 - 437), the doctrine is stated, in the opin-

ion of the court, as follows : "There is no doubt but that
the authorities of towns and cities, whose duty it is to keep
the streets and public ways in repair for the use of the public, may repair the same in a reasonable manner without incurring any liability to adjoining proprietors, even though
said improvements may cause a change in the natural flow of
surface water, to their injury.

The general rule, however,

is that either municipal corporations or private persons may
so occupy and improve their land, and use it for such purposes
as they may see fit, either by grading or filling up low places, or by erecting buildings thereon, or making any other
improvements thereon to make it fit for cultivation, or any
other profitable or desirable enjoyment ;

and it makes no

difference that the effect of such improvements is to change
the flow of the surface water accumulating or falling on the
surrounding country, so as to either increase or diminish the
quantity of such water which had previously flowed upon the
land of the adjoining proprietors, to their inconvenience or

injury.

The same rule would apply to waters flowing over

the country, which had escaped from the banks or the natural
channel of a running stream of water, by reason of a flood in
the stream, occasioned by heavy rains or the melting of snow
on the surrounding country.

But a person exercising this

right to improve and ameliorate the condition of his own land
must exercise it in a prudent and careful way.

He must

improve and use his own land in a reasonable way, and in so
doing he may turn the course of and protect his own land from
the surface water flowing there on, and he will not be liable
for any incidental injury occasioned to others by the changed
course in which the water may naturally flow, and for its increase upon the land of others.

Each proprietor, in such

case, is left to protect his own land against the common enemy of all."
The principles enunciated in the case above referred to
have been adhered to in cases both before and after the rendition of this opinion.
Hosher v. L. I_.,
Jones v. H.nnovan
Imie

v.

StL.

Among them are the following
L. k £L. 2-. B. 1J. --.
(55 Mo. 462.)

y of Sprinfield.

Benson v. L. &A. L. i. £Co.

(55 Mo.

(78 Mo.)

18.)

(60 Mo.)

Stewart v. Clit.
Ab

v

(79 Mo. 603.)

. f.,.i

&_1.

. 1. BL. fo.

(83 Mo. 271.)

There have been two cases in the Missouri Supreme Court
holding to the civil law doctrine on this subject.
it was there held that

That is,

"a land owner has no right, by erect-

ing an embanknent, to stop the natural flow of surface water
or to direct its course so as to throw it upon the land of
his neighbor.

(McCormick v. &. L., 3L. I.

70 Mo. 359 ;

a

& L. Bi. BL. BR. C.,

v. B.. Co.v 71 Mo. 237.)

But in each

of the cases last referred to there was a dissenting opinion,
and in the case referred to in 83 Mo., the rulings in the
cases of 70 and 71 Mo. were overruled.

Judge Ray, deliver-

ing the opinion of the court, used this language :

"With all

due respect for the acknowledged ability of the distinguished
jurist who wrote those opinions, we feel constrained to recognize the common law doctrine on this subject, so often and
repeatedly approved by this court, without division, in all
its earlier and later decisions, as still the law in this
State.

The rule of the comnmon law, as expounded in the nu-

merous decisions quoted above, we think, after all, best promotes and conserves the varied and important interests of both
the public and of private individuals, incidental to and grow-
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ing out of this question.

It permits and encourages public

and private improvements, and at the same time restrains those
engaged in such enterprises from unnecessarily or carelessly
injuring another.

A strict and literal application of the

doctrine of the civil law would, we think, in many places, and
in large districts of country, materially retard if not utterly destroy many useful and profitable improvements, pursuits
and enterprises."

